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BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents contend that appellants' Statement of Facts 
is misleading, immaterial, incorrect and contrary to the evidence 
in many particulars and therefore prefer to re-state the facts 
in a manner consistent with the chronology of events, the 
evidence, and the findings of the lower court (R. 114-119). 
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In the year 1894 a young boy of 14 by the name of William 
Ferguson lived with his parents on a farm in the area of 13th 
East and 56th South Streets in Salt Lake County. This area 
contained many ~prings which created a stream, known as 
"Spring Runs," where he swam, herded cows and spent much 
of his boyhood and subsequent lifetime (R. 255, 256). At the 
trial of this case, ~orne 63 years later, Mr. Ferguson (now 78 
years old) appeared and outlined the transition of the area 
from practically a pioneer outpost to the present time. 
For the purposes of general reference a map has been 
prepared and inserted on page 5, showing the general area 
which is the subject of this law suit. 
At that time the stream had cut a deep gully through the 
western portion of what will be referred to as the "Ferguson 
Property," having been created by natural waters long before 
man came to the Salt Lake Valley (R. 299). One of the biggest 
sources of water which fed the stream was a large spring area 
(see map-p. 5, "Bubbling Springs" area), which Mr. Ferguson 
described as follows: 
"That is where your big spring was . . . it was ten 
feet across and sand was bubbling up in there. You 
could see the gravel, and there was fish in there over 
a foot long" (R. 262). 
From the "bubbling springs" area to the point where the 
stream left the west end of the Ferguson property, the stream 
into which it flowed dropped approximately six to eight feet 
in elevation (R. 220, 299). After leaving the Ferguson property 
the stream entered the east end of the property of Mr: J. W. 
"Tim" Boyce, predecessor in interest of respondents. 
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(Aerial Photo) 
"Bubbling Springs'' 
(North) 
Appellants' Drain 
To Moyle Pond 
UPPER POND 
"Tim" Boyce Ditch 
(Built in 1894) 
LOWER POND 
(1905) 
FERGUSON PROPERTY 
(APPELLANTS) 
~-- fl --Replacement Ditch 
5 
(1910·1920) 
Used Until 1955 
"TIM" BOYCE PROPERTY 
(RESPONDENTS) 
·:·~~-------~ 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Realizing the value of this excellent stream of water, the 
elder Ferguson decided to use it for fish culture and irrigation 
purposes. "Tim" Boyce, the neighbor on the west, also decided 
to utilize part of the water for irrigation purposes, and so 
the two neighbors, being assisted by young William Ferguson, 
jointly furnished the materials and labor and constructed a dam 
across the channel at a point where it was only necessary to 
back the water to a depth of approximately three or four feet 
(R. 153, 258-260), thereby making it possible to take water 
out of the stream on both sides. 
From this pond (referred to as the "Middle Pond") the 
elder Ferguson and "Tim" Boyce took a spirit level and marked 
the course of a ditch to run west to the Boyce property (R. 
259). Without the assistance of animals or machinery, and 
by using simple tools, the three of them picked and dug a ditch 
from the "Middle Pond" to the east boundary of the Boyce 
property. These neighbors traded work a good deal of the 
time (R. 267, 275) and the Fergusons used the jointly con-
structed ditch to water an orchard which was located just west 
of where the "Lower Pond" was subsequently built. 
William Ferguson stated that he kept in close contact with 
the area over the years and up to the present time (R. 273). 
During his visits Mr. Ferguson observed that "Tim" Boyce 
continued to use the water from Spring Runs every year, and 
grew potatoes, hay, grain, sugar beets and corn on his farm 
(R. 273). 
Between 1903 and 1905 Mr. Ferguson built both the 
Upper Pond and the Lower Pond, primarily for the purpose 
of utilizing the water for fish culture (R. 264). Also, com-
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mencing at about that time and at intervals thereafter until 
approximately 1934, several flowing wells were drilled in the 
vicinity to supplement the flow of spring water during the 
winter months when the spring flow receded somewhat. How-
ever, these wells were subsequently capped prior to the com-
mencement of this litigation and have no bearing on the issues 
in this case as far as the parties to this appear are concerned 
since they tapped water sources far beneath the water which 
created the "bubbling springs." 
At some time between 1910 and 1920, according to Mr. 
Ferguson, the ditch which was built in 1894 from the "Middle 
Pond" to the Boyce property was replaced with a new ditch 
(R. 266) which served the Boyce property and the Ferguson 
orchard from the "Lower Pond." 
In 1914 a general water adjudication was made of the 
waters of Big Cottonwood Creek in the case of rry he Progress 
Company vs. Salt Lake City, et al., No. 8921" in the Third 
District Court of Salt Lake County. This adjudication was 
finally terminated in the Utah Supreme Court in 1918, 53 
Utah 556, 173 P. 705. The Sixteenth paragraph of that Decree 
adjudicated the waters here involved to J. W. "Tim" Boyce, 
the Fergusons and others in the general area for fish culture 
and irrigation purposes. 
Respondents Seo and Kano purchased the "Tim" Boyce 
farm from a man by the name of Brinton Bagley in 1944. This 
farm consisted of approximately 25 acres, of which 20 acres 
has been farmed and irrigated since 1894. Respondents have 
raised celery, cabbage, onions, lettuce, corn and similar crops 
which they have marketed in the Salt Lake area. Celery has 
been their main crop. 
7 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The Utah Legislature in 1949 passed Sections 100-2-14 
and 100-5-15, Utah Code Anno., 1943, which in general pro-
vided that claimants to the use of water which had been estab-
lished by diligence usage prior to 1903 could file a statement 
in the office of the State Engineer setting forth the particulars 
of their claim. 
Although the legislative act provided that it was unneces-
sary to file such claims where there had been a court decree 
adjudicating the rights as to any waters, Mr. John Ward, who 
was in the office of the State Engineer at the time, prepared a 
Statement of Diligence Claim (Exh. 4-P) for respondents, at 
their request, giving as his reason that the Cottonwood Decree 
did not sufficiently specify the particular rights of each of the 
individuals designated in the Sixteenth paragraph. The State-
ment of Water Users Claim which respondents filed on October 
13, 1949, was the very first statement filed in the office of the 
State Engineer under the 1949 Act (Exh. 4-P). 
Appellants Shaw and Capson came into the picture in 
February, 1955, at which time they acquired the Ferguson 
property from subsequent owners. During the month of Feb-
ruary Shaw and Capson contacted the respondents concerning 
the possibility of purchasing parts of the lands owned by them 
adjacent to the Ferguson property on the west. However, 
respondents informed Shaw and Capson that they were not 
interested in selling any property, and further advised them 
of their water rights and facilities (R. 168). 
About a week later Shaw and Capson came to discuss the 
water matter \vith plaintiffs. and asked 11r. Seo where he 
wanted his ditch placed (R. 168): 
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"I want you people to tell me where you want that 
ditch placed, and I will have it there for you." 
A general discussion took place and a rough sketch was 
prepared of the substitute facilities which appellants agreed 
to construct. It was even decided (R. 168) that a run-off or 
waste channel could be constructed on the Kano-Seo property, 
running north along their east line and dumping back into 
the channel of the stream. It was also agreed that an open 
ditch, conveying water by means of gravity, would run east 
from their property to the source of the water. 
About April 15, 1955, a group of individuals which in-
cluded Shaw, Capson, John Ward and the respondents, met 
on the Ferguson property, at which time the course of the 
ditch was determined and Mr. Shaw stated: 
"This is where the ditch will go. Through here, right 
into your property." 
Mr. Seo testified (R. 170) that he informed Mr. Shaw it 
would be satisfactory to place the ditch as indicated. At no 
time during the trial did Mr. Shaw deny making the statements 
previously quoted. 
On May 12, 1955, it became apparent to respondents that 
appellants were not only filling in the ponds and destroying 
their ditches, headgates and other irrigation works, but that 
they had constructed an underground drainage system (see 
Map-p. 5) for the purpose of intercepting all spring water 
in the area (R. 427). Further, appellants took earth-moving 
equipment and lowered the level of the land east of respond-
ents' property, thereby making it impossible for water to enter 
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respondents' property by means of a gravity flow (Exh. 5-P). 
Respondents contacted an attorney the next day, who in turn 
wrote a letter (Exh. 34-D) to appellant Shaw, notifying him 
of the seriousness of the situation. Appellant Shaw ignored 
their request that something be done (R. 421). 
The drain which defendants constructed collected all of 
the water which they had previously been able to secure by 
gravity flow and discharged it into the natural channel of 
Spring Runs Creek at the point where the original channel of 
Spring Runs entered the property of respondents. This drain 
was so constructed that it ran through the very middle of the 
"bubbling springs" area (R. 16(}-Also see Map). This is 
exactly contrary to the statements on page 6 of appellants' 
brief. Further, although appellants' statement of facts states 
that there was no visible surface stream when the ponds were 
filled, the evidence showed that just before they were filled, the 
"bubbling springs" area had been covered over with earth-
moving equipment and the ponds were drained, thereby tem-
porarily stopping the flow of surface waters (R. 393-also note 
May 20, 1955 flow from area as shown on Exh. 7-P). 
Being unable to secure water immediately because the 
point at which it was being discharged was about 7 feet lower 
than the point where their gravity ditch originally entered 
their property, respondents suffered losses to their crops and 
incurred other expenses. They were forced to construct a dam 
in the channel of Spring Run Creek on their own property, 
and to temporarily rent and later purchase a pump. 
Although appellants claim in their statement of facts 
( Br. 5) that respondents brought a separate suit against Salt 
10 
·_,_..-
·c: 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Lake City due to capping of the wells, such is a clear misstate-
ment. These respondents were merely made nominal defendants 
by Salt Lake City in an action which it brought against the 
State Engineer arising out of a denial of requests for change 
applications. The issues in that case were not found against 
these respondents; rather, the order granting the change appli-
cation was expressly made subject to the water rights of these 
respondents and fully protected them, thereby making an 
appeal totally unnecessary. There is not now, and probably 
never was, any real issue between Salt Lake City Corporation 
and respondents. 
The lower court awarded respondents damages for costs 
of pumping, crop losses, and expenses incurred for purchase 
of pumping equipment and the construction of a dam for 
pumping purposes. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. APPELLANTS HAD NO RIGHT TO INTERFERE 
WITH THE WATER SOURCES AND NATURAL 
CHANNEL OF SPRING RUNS. 
II. APPELLANTS CANNOT DESTROY EASEMENTS 
CREATED TO CONVEY WATERS ACROSS 
THEIR LANDS TO THE LANDS OF ANOTHER. 
III. APPELLANTS SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO 
PUMP A QUANTITY OF WATER SUFFICIENT 
TO IRRIGATE RESPONDENTS' LANDS. 
IV. THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES ADOPTED BY 
THE LOWER COURT WAS CORRECT. 
11 
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V. THE JUDGMENT SHOULD STAND AGAINST 
FOUR OF THE APPELLANTS. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
APPELLANTS HAD NO RIGHT TO INTERFERE 
WITH THE WATER SOURCES AND NATURAL CHAN-
NEL OF SPRING RUNS. 
Appellants contend that a point of crucial public interest 
is involved in this case. Respondents also contend that there 
is a crucial public issue involved, but not the one advanced 
by appellants. Whether a landowner has a vested right to 
force a neighboring owner to maintain the water table in 
an adjacent land at or near the surface level is not at issue 
under the facts before the court. 
Respondents submit that the real public issue before the 
court concerns the right of a landowner to interfere with 
ditches, headgates, dams, natural water courses, and large 
and well-established springs located upon his lands to which 
appropriators have acquired vested rights to take and use the 
water and to maintain and use ditches and other easements in 
order to convey such water to the latter's lands. 
Respondents submit that appellants have used pages 9 
to 23 of their brief in developing legal concepts which are 
not at issue in this case. The cases there cited deal with 
percolating water, maintenance of u·c1ter tables and sub-irri-
gation rights. However, we are not here concerned with per-
colating water, water tables or sub-irrigation problems; we 
12 
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are concerned with the locally famous "Spring Runs," an 
active, dynamic water course which has been the subject of 
appropriation and a general court adjudication during its 
history. 
It might be well to determine just what are "percolating" 
waters since appellants use much space in developing the topic. 
In the case of Riordan vs. Westwood, 203 P 2d 922 (Utah), 
the Utah Supreme Court, speaking through Justices Wade and 
McDonough, points out that the concept of "percolating" 
waters in this state has changed over the years and that the 
cases and texts were in confusion as to the term. That case 
accepted "percolating" waters to be-
"diffused waters in lands privately owned, percolat-
ing or seeping through the ground, moving by gravity 
in any or every direction along a line of least resist-
ance, not forming any part of a stream or other body 
of water either surface or subterranean, and, as far as 
known, not contributing or tributary to a flow of any 
defined stream or body of water ... " (Italics added.) 
From the foregoing definition, and considering the factual 
situation involved, one can hardly imagine any waters any-
where which more completely depart from the foregoing 
definition. Compare the following established facts which 
fully support the court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law (R. 114-121): 
( 1) "Spring Runs" were in evidence long before 
the white man came to Salt Lake Valley, and have been 
considered as "one of the old landmarks on the valley 
floor" (R. 299). 
( 2) These waters were so important as to be in-
cluded within the Big Cottonwood Creek water adjudi-
cation of 1914. 
13 
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( 3) The waters which came to the surface in the 
"bubbling spring" area were "perched" waters, part of 
which originated far to the east in the Big Cottonwood 
Creek channel, and traveled underground on top of 
an impervious clay strata until they came to the surface 
in the "Spring Run" area (R. 299, 305, 322). 
( 4) Although the Moyle Pond located a short dis-
tance to the east had dried up and irrigation had ceased 
in the area, just prior to the activities of appellants 
complained of in this action, there was no noticeable 
effect on the subsequent How of the springs which were 
collected in the drain system of appellants (R. 321, 
329, 463). 
Respondents wish to take sharp issue with certain state-
ments contained in appellants' brief at pages 22-23 wherein 
they question whether any water would have been available 
in 1955 because irrigation had ceased in the immediate area. 
Actually, the How from the drains that summer consisted of 
a flow of from four to six second feet (R. 15 7, 311), which 
by local standards is a good, big irrigation stream. Further, 
even as of May 20, 1955, a good, small stream was issuing 
from the drain despite a total lack of irrigation anywhere 
within miles at the time (Exh. 7-P). Commenting on the 
summer flows since 1955, Engineer John Ward was "surprised 
at the amount of water that actually came out of the drain" 
(R. 321, 329). Viewing the situation generally, respondents 
submit that appellants are now crossing their fingers lest the 
drain should get clogged and much of their subdivision float 
away. 
Note: It will be well for the court to remember that 
appellants were careful to place their drain through the very 
heart of the "bubbling springs" area (See Map. Also R. 160). 
14 
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Appellants would have the court believe that we have a 
situation somewhat akin to a sponge, where the "water table" 
becomes saturated to the point where it gradually overflows. 
Quite the contrary; it is hard to conceive of a more active spring 
area than that involved in this case. Nor do the cases of 
Peterson t'S. Cache County Drainage District, 77 Utah 256, 
294 P 289 and Roberts vs. Gribble, 43 Utah 411, 134 P 1014, 
serve to help their cause. In fact, respondents contend that 
both of those cases contain factual situations which pointedly 
distinguish this case. 
In the case of Roberts vs. Gribble the waters involved were 
merely seepage and percolating water which the court found-
"Passed beneath the surface of and through the de-
fendant's land . . . " and " . . . never reached said 
Sanpitch Ri;,er by any known or defined channel or 
course ... 
In the case of Peterson vs. Cache County Drainage District 
the waters involved there were actually percolating waters. 
The issue of the case involved the right of the defendant to 
dig a drain which lowered the water table of the land of the 
defendant which had previously made it possible for the 
plaintiff to irrigate his land by sub-irrigation. Notwithstanding 
any encroachment upon that case which may have been created 
by the decision of Riordan vs. Westwood, supra, it was pointed 
out that the water in that case did not flow in any well-defined 
channel and never reached the surface. The actual rule an-
nounced in that case was stated quite simply: 
"Percolating water fesulting from the irrigation of 
one's own land may be recovered and used by the owner 
15 
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before it leaves his land without invading any right 
of an adjoining landowner." 
A search of the cases has convinced this writer that there 
is not a single Utah case nor any other case quoted by appel-
lants which would justify appellants' trespass upon the water 
and property rights of these respondents. 
In the Utah case of McNaughton vs. Eaton, 242 P 2d 570, 
there was a situation where various sources of water flowed 
into McNaughton Gulch, which " ... was a natural water 
course before the advent of irrigation water in this neighbor-
hood." The waters in the gulch arose from ( 1) natural sources, 
( 2) canal surplus and waste waters turned into the gulch to 
get rid of them, and ( 3) canal waters used to irrigate lands 
on both sides of the gulch which drained into it above plain-
tiffs' lands; and ( 4) other miscellaneous sources of water. 
The court observed that the three sources produced water 
which was subject to appropriation, and that since the usage 
began prior to 1903, no application to appropriate was neces-
sary. In reversing the lower court and in affirming appellants' 
attorney, who was on the other side of the fence in that case, 
Justice Wade stated: 
"Here we are not dealing with the collection of 
diffused waters from the soil but with the right to use 
waters which have already collected in a stream." 
It is also interesting to note that plaintiffs' original Com-
plaint (R. 2) and plaintiffs' Amended Complaint (R. 84) 
both alleged: 
"5. The lands of plaintiff and defendant ... overlie 
an artesian basin." 
16 
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Since appellants' Answer (R. 96) admitted the foregoing 
allegation they appear to be in a rather untenable position 
at this point in view of the following quotation from Riordan 
vs. Westwood: 
"These cases held that the waters of artesian basins 
are underground waters 'flowing ... in known or de-
fined channels' ... and (are) subject to appropria-
tion." 
If appellants are permitted to interfere with water facili-
ties and easements and rights to use water which have been 
protected and created by the long usage and diligence shown 
in this case, and considering the source and size of flow of 
the waters involved, respondents submit that there is hardly 
a water right in the State of Utah that cannot be destroyed at 
the will of the owner of the property upon which the water 
anses. 
As stated in 56 Am. Jur. Waters, p. 505, Sec. 14: 
" ... the ordinary or natural course of water cannot 
lawfully be changed for the benefit of one person or 
class of persons to the injury of another. Accordingly, 
one who changes the course of a stream must do so in 
such manner as not to injure, or duly interfere with 
the rights of, the adjoining proprietor, either above 
or below, or on the opposite side of the stream." 
II. 
APPELLANTS CANNOT DESTROY EASEMENTS 
CREATED TO CONVEY WATERS ACROSS TIIEIR LAND 
TO THE LANDS OF ANOTHER. 
17 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Appellants next contend that the court erred in holding 
that respondents have an easement or right to require the 
maintenance of the Lower Pond on the Ferguson property. 
But the Judgment and Decree and the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law (R. 114-125) contain no reference what-
soever to requiring appellants to maintain the pond. On the 
contrary, the court made express findings that it was no longer 
feasible for respondents to secure water through their original 
facilities (R. 119, 123) and, in lieu thereof, ordered the 
appellants to install and maintain an electrical pumping system 
as a substitute means for securing water (R. 123). 
These respondents have never insisted that appellants 
maintain the Lower Pond. In their discussions with appellants 
Shaw and Capson, respondents informed them that they would 
be satisfied with an open surface ditch which would convey 
water from the springs to their farm by a gravity flow. Re-
spondents submit that they cannot see why appellants should 
raise any issue involving the maintenance of the Lower Pond. 
Appellants' brief (p. 24-31) contain cases inapplicable to 
the factual situation in this case. Further, there is a noticeable 
absence of Utah decisions. However, their quoted annotation 
from 50 A.L.R. 841 clearly recognizes that there are circum-
stances which might require the continued maintenance of such 
a pond if respondents had so insisted in this case. 
It appears from the facts that the original ditch which 
was constructed in 1894 from the Middle Pond to the "Tim" 
Boyce property (R. 259) was placed in a new location running 
out of the Lower Pond for the joint benefit of the owners of 
both the dominant and servient properties to both shorten 
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its length and yet water both the Ferguson orchard and the 
"Tim" Boyce farm (R. 271, 287). It can hardly be argued 
by appellants that the original ditch which tapped the channel 
at the dam in the Middle Pond was "abandoned" (Br. 4) as 
they wish the court to assume. It is obvious that the ditch 
easement was changed to a new location by mutual consent. 
The situation presented is quite different from requiring the 
maintenance of an artificial condition for the benefit of one 
who had contributed nothing to its erection or maintenance 
since the use by the "Tim" Boyce property of the Lower Pond 
was tied to the work and labor contributed by "Tim" Boyce 
in the construction of the Middle Pond. 
The extent of respondents' rights would be covered in 
this court's pronouncement in Tripp vs. Bagley, 74 Utah 57, 
276 P. 912: 
" ... The defendants, however, allege, and the evi-
dence shows, that a natural water channel ran across 
the lands owned by the plaintiff on to the lands owned 
by defendant . . . While the law is well-settled that 
an easement by prescription cannot be acquired in less 
than 20 years continuous usage, such is not the law 
when applied to the right to convey water through a 
natural channel across the lands of another." 
"The law is also well settled that, when an easement 
has once been established, its location may be changed 
by an executed oral agreement betwen the owner of 
the servient estate and the owner of the dominant estate 
(Citing cases) . The consent of the owner of the servient 
estate to a change in the location of an easement may 
be implied from acquiescence . . . When the location 
has been changed by an agreement, either express or 
implied ... such location cannot again be changed 
again without the mutual consent of such owners." 
19 
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· · . . . When a person has a right to convey water 
through a natural channel across lands of another, such 
right is not lost when the owner of the right constructs, 
without objection, an artificial ditch or ditches across 
such land and uses .the same for a number of years 
to convey the irrigation water theretofor conveyed 
through the natural channel. In such case the owner 
of the easement has the right to continue to use the 
artificial ditch or ditches so constructed in lieu of the 
original natural water course." 
The foregoing rule was condensed in 56 Am. Jur., Waters, 
p. 702, Sec. 244: 
"In like manner if several persons contract expressly, 
or so act that from their conduct a contract will be 
implied, for the creation, maintenance, or use of an 
artificial condition of a body of water, this contract 
will be enforced so far as it can be consistently with 
the rules of law." 
From the foregoing it appears that respondents could 
have insisted that the Lower Pond be maintained, not on any 
dubious "riparian rights" doctrine but on the basis of an oral 
change of location of the easement. However, since respondents 
were agreeable to locating their ditches in any reasonable 
manner which would deliver their water to them by gravity 
flow (R. 170) the issue raised by appellants would now be 
moot. 
III. 
APPELLANTS SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO PUMP A 
QUANTITY OF WATER SUFFICIENT TO IRRIGATE 
RESPONDENTS' LANDS. 
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Throughout their brief appellants acknowledge that they 
claim no interest in the water (Br. 9) and make no contest 
to the right to use it, yet whenever they try to establish a 
legal point they invariably refer to water law cases which 
actually involve contests to the use of water. 
It is quite obvious that the ground area involved in this 
litigation had so much water that appellants were trying to 
dispose of it in every possible way. After they had constructed 
their drainage system, the stream flow which was discharged 
from the drain was as great as 4 to 6 second feet during 
summer months (R. 15 7, 311) . Even during winter and early 
spring months since the drain has been constructed, at no time 
has the drain flow from spring sources been insufficient for 
respondents' irrigation needs (R. 166, 252, 463-Exh. 7-P). 
The really significant observation peculiar to this case is 
that appellants have never contended that the amount of water 
conveyed across the servient property by respondents has 
constituted an unreasonable burden. Instead, they argue that 
the court has decreed to respondents a water right of approxi-
mately 3.0 feet per second. Respondents deny that the court 
decreed a "water right" in the sense implied. It only recognized 
in general terms the existence of the water right. 
At the trial appellants introduced testimony from a Mr. 
Bagley to the effect that during approximately 16 years while 
he owned respondents' property he had irrigated fewer acres 
of land than respendents have irrigated. From this they argue 
that thw:e has been a loss of part of the water rights by non-
use-a matter which appellants elsewhere admit does not 
concern them. But they have missed the real issue entirely 
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because we are here dealing with easement rights for ditches 
and irrigation facilities which can only be lost or diminished 
by a non-use for 20 years. Even if Mr. Bagley had irrigated 
but one acre of land during his 16 years of ownership, any 
prior established easement rights would not have been lost 
unless an abandonment had been established. (See .Amended 
Complaint-Count Two-R. 87, 88). 
Since Mr. William Ferguson observed that "Tim" Boyce 
irrigated respondents' property every year subsequent to 1894 
to grow corn, potatoes, sugar beets, grain and alfalfa (R. 
273), appellants have failed to produce any evidence which 
would sustain their burden of proof that there either was no 
easement or that its size and extent has been lessened by 
non-use. 
Our Utah Supreme Court has stated the rule quite clearly 
in the case of Zollinger vs. Frank, 110 Utah 514, 175 P 2d 
714, 170 A.L.R. 770-775, adopting the rule set ford1 in 17 
Am. Jur., Easements, Sec. 72: 
"The prevailing rule is that where a claimant has 
shown an open, visible, continuous, and unmolested 
use of land for the period of time sufficient to acquire 
an easement by adverse user, the use ''-·ill be presumed 
Ul· 
. :L 
li-
to be under a claim of right. The owner of the servient ~ 
estate, in order to avoid the acquisition of an easement 
by prescription, has the burden of rebutting this pre-
sumption by showing that the use was permissive ... " )_. 
See also Thompson on Real Property, Sec. 394, Vol. I, 
page 509. 
"We think the better rule is that describe! as the ~ttr ~ 
prevailing rule in the above ~.luotation. That is, where to~ 
a claimant has shown an open and continuous use of 
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the land for the prescriptive period ( 20 years in Utah) 
the use will be presumed to have been against the 
owner, and the owner of the servient estate to prevent 
the prescriptive easement from arising has the burden 
of showing that the use was under him instead of 
against him. This rule was mentioned in the recent 
case of Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. vs. Moyle, 
Utah, 159 P 2d 596 (on rehearing) 174 P 2d 148, 155, 
where it was said: "It is true that to establish an ease-
ment the use must be notorious and continuous and on 
this, adverseness-that is, holding against the owner 
-will be presumed.'' 
In stating in the Judgment and Decree that "plaintiffs are 
the owners and entitled to the use of approximately 3.0 cubic 
feet per second of the waters of Spring Run Creek, . . . " (R. 
123), the court was merely making a general observation 
which was immaterial to the actual decision on the matter. 
What is material to the decision is the requirement in the 
Judgment and Decree providing for a pumping system for 
respondents and ordering appellants to "maintain and operate 
the said electrical pumping system for plaintiffs." 
Appellants contend (Br. 36) that they can be forced to 
pump water at the rate of three c.f.s. "almost at the whim of 
respondents." Such is not the case despite the fact that for 
three years they have refused to pump a drop of water. 
Respondents insist only that appellants pump such amount 
of water as is reasonably and necessarily needed for their crops 
on 20 acres of land. As appellants indicate in their brief (Br. 
34), the size of the flow need not exceed two second feet 
at any given time (R. 155). Nor will respondents expect 
appellants to pump more than the aggregate of 120 acre feet 
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per year testified as necessary by Engineer John Ward (R. 332), 
which is substantially identical with the amount (122.7 acre 
feet) which they set forth at the time they filed their Statement 
of Claim to Diligence Rights in 1949 (Exh. 4-P). 
In fact, using the figures of their own witness, }.1r. 
Templeton, of a five-month (May 15 to October 15) pumping 
period (R. 156, 218) at a pumping cost of $15.00 per month 
(R. 233), plus a minimum of $25.00 per year repair and 
maintenance cost, or a total yearly cost of $100.00 for operation 
of an electrical pumping system which can now be installed 
due to the presence of electricity, respondents will agree to 
pump their own water if appellants will give them a sum of 
money which will, when invested at four ( 4%) per cent, yield 
$100.00 per annum. 
Should appellants decline any of the foregoing arrange-
ments, it is submitted that the lower court retains ample juris-
diction to prevent appellants from suffering any undue hard-
ship, since in any event respondents would be limited to the 
amount of water which could be beneficially used. 
It is submitted that the cases quoted by appellant on pages 
36 and 3 7 of their brief relate only to situations involving 
contests establishing decreed water rights where there is a 
requirement of exactness as between contesting claimants. 
Since respondents are not quarreling with appellants over the 
size of the water right, but rather seek such reasonable quantity 
of water as they have beneficialiy used, based upon established 
casement rights to convey such quantity of water across appel-
lants· lands, it \vould have been more appropriate for appellants, 
both at the trial and on ~tppeal, to haYe attempted to produce 
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evidence and law limiting the size of the water flowage ease-
ment on their servient property. 
* * * * 
Appellants have further sought to limit the quantity of 
water which must be pumped for respondents by claiming 
that it is geometrically possible to irrigate all but five acres of 
respondents' land by gravity flow from the catch-basin which 
was built for pumping purposes. 
This point was raised when, during the trial, appellants 
took a survey crew and went upon respondents' lands to 
establish an imaginary contour line which a ditch might follow. 
Typically, this trespass was made without permission and 
resulted in considerable tramping around in a freshly planted 
onion patch (R. 452, 460). 
Here, too, they have avoided the law and the facts: 
( 1) As a matter of law, it is not necessary for one 
having an easement for conveying water across the 
lands of another to substitute, at his own expense, a 
new method of conveying water in order to pacify a 
wrongdoer. 
( 2) The use of such a contemplated ditch would 
create "odd-shaped" fields (R. 454), would make it 
difficult to farm row-crops by making triangle pieces, 
would create roadway problems, would create "waste" 
ground, would cause uneven length of rows in each 
field, and would cause difficulty in operating machinery 
in narrow corners (R. 451). 
( 3) Respondents would have to bear the expense 
of constructing the ditch and the making of levees in 
some spots (R. 45 5) . 
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( 4) Any necessary enlargement of respondents' 
present impounding dam would cause seepage and 
would back water over the top of the outlet of appel-
lants' drainage system (R. 45 5-45 7). 
IV 
THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES ADOPTED BY THE 
LOWER COURT WAS CORRECT. 
At this point plaintiffs wish to quote pertinent provisions 
contained in the Utah case of Hanson n. Salt Lake City, 205 
P. 2d 255 at Page 261, which included language from the case 
of Salt Lake City vs. Gardner, 39 Utah 30, 114 P 147, for the 
purpose of illustrating the clear-cut right to damages in a case 
of this type. Since the Gardner case involved the right to a 
gravity flow of water, the statement quoted therefrom in the 
Hanson decision appears appropriate: 
" . . . If it be held, therefore, that a subsequent 
appropriator of water need have no regard for the 
diverting means or methods of the prior appropriator, 
but may in fact or effect make prior appropriations of 
water unavailable with impunity, then there is in fact 
no such a right as a prior right, but all rights may, at 
any time, be invaded o1· destroyed by a subsequent 
appropriator by simply making the diverting means 
used by the prior appropt"iato1' useless. To permit such 
an invasion of a prior right would, in effect, amount to 
an indirect taking of a prior appropriator's water. This 
neither the legislative nor the judicial power can allow 
without permitting confiscation of property rights." 
" . . . the risk of interfering with prior rights and 
the cost of any change in the prior appropriator's 
means or methods of diversion should be assumed and 
borne by the subsequent appropriator, ... " 
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" ... As to surface waters, no one has ever seriously 
made the claim that a subsequent appropriator could 
deprive a prior appropriator of his water through the 
means of diversion which he established and make him 
pay an additional expense to get the water by a different 
means of diversion." 
Should a bare trespasser, making no claim to the use of 
water, stand in a better position than a junior appropriator? 
In answering appellant's claim that respondents did not 
mitigate their damages, it would be well to realize that Mr. 
Sea did not actually discover until May 12, 1955, that appel-
lants' activities prevented a gravity flow of water from ever 
coming to his lands (R. 427-Exh. 5-P). Prior to that date 
he was relying on express representations of Mr. Shaw and 
Mr. Capson that suitable gravity system would be installed 
(R. 170): 
"This is where the ditch will go. Through there, right 
through your property." 
The next day they contacted their lawyer, who then wrote 
to Mr. Shaw (Exh. 34-D), but no answer was received in 
reply to their demands that something be done. 
Respondents immediately thereupon built an earthen dam 
in the natural channel of Spring Runs in their own property 
so as to create a pumping pond and immediately sought pump-
ing equipment (R. 427). It was about ten days later (May 23, 
1955) before they were able to get water on their lands. 
In the meantime they sustained extensive damages due to 
lack of water. An ample suppiy of spring water was then being 
discharged from the drainage system which defendants built, 
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having resumed its flow as soon as the drain was built on or 
about May 5,1955 (R. 166, 215). 
Although Shaw and the other appellants had indicated 
to respondents as late as April 15, 1955, that a gravity flow 
of water would be furnished by means of a ditch, the sub-
division plat ( Exh. 30) which shows the contemplated drain 
system having been inserted prior to March 29, 1955, makes 
it evident that we have here an intentional tort showing that 
appellants long previously had planned to do away with the 
source of respondents' water. This circumstance should re-
lieve respondents of any necessity for minimizing their 
damages. See 15 Am. Jur., Damages, P. 441, Sec. 41: 
"In some states the rule requiring one to minimize 
the damages arising from an injury to property does 
not apply in cases of intentional or positive torts ... 
Thus, ... the rule does not apply in cases ... where 
one riparian owner diminishes or detains the water of 
a stream to the damage of another riparian owner." 
If we allow to appellants the benefit of doubt and apply 
the ordinary rule of minimization of damages, they still are 
unable to complain. The evidence shows that respondents 
were very busy at the time preparing their ground for planting 
of celery plants and other crops, and that they were working 
from sunup to sundown (R. 428). In addition to their farm 
activities they also had to secure a pump and construct a 
substantial dam so as to create a pumping pond. 
Further, they incurred cash expenses which certainly 
seriously impaired their financial position at the time--$100.00 
for pump rental, $826.00 for pump and pipe, $100.00 for a 
trailer to haul pipe and $80.00 to construct a dam. In addition, 
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they incurred and paid pumping expenses of $1,634.25 in 
1955 (Exh. 9-P) and $1,859.12 in 1956 (Exh. 10-P). 
It is submitted that the proper rule to follow in respect 
to minimization of damage is set forth in 15 Am. Jur., Dam-
ages, p. 420, Sec. 27 (citing Jankele vs. Texas Co., 88 Utah 
325, 54 p 2d 425): 
"One who is injured by the wrongful or negligent 
acts of another, whether as the result of a tort or of 
a breach of contract, is bound to exercise reasonable 
care and diligence to avoid loss or to minimize or lessen 
the resulting damage, and to the extent that his dam-
ages are the result of his active and unreasonable en-
hancement thereof or are due to his failure to exercise 
such care and diligence, he cannot recover; or, as the 
rule is sometimes stated, he is bound to protect himself 
if he can do so with reasonable exertion or at trifling 
expense, and can recover from the delinquent party 
only such damages as he could not, with reasonable 
effort, have avoided." 
11/n cases of intentional torts, the injured person is 
not precluded, by his mere failure to exercise reason-
able care to avoid the consequences of the injury, from 
recovering for so much of the damage as results from 
that failure." (Italics added). 
Respondents' efforts certainly exceeded the test of a 
"reasonable exertion" and the sums spent were more than 
merely "trifling." From the same Am. Jur. citation, Section 28: 
"The rule requiring one injured by the wrongful act 
or omission of another to minimize the damages re-
sulting does not require the injured person to make 
extraordinary efforts or to do what is unreasonable or 
impracticable in his efforts to minimize those damages; 
reasonable diligence and ordinary care is all that is 
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required of him. The measure of his duty is such care 
and diligence as a man of ordinary prudence would 
use under the circumstances, and the efforts required of 
him must be determined by the rules of common sense, 
good faith, and fair dealing." 
Sec. 29: 
"The efforts required of the injured party to prevent 
or lessen his damages include a reasonable expenditure 
of money, which he may recover as part of his dam-
ages. He is not, however, required to incur large ex-
penses. A common statement of the rule is that he must 
protect himself if he can do so at trifling expense. It 
appears that a want of sufficient funds will excuse 
an absence of effort to lessen damages.'' (Italics added.) 
The measure of damages in cases of this kind has been 
well stated in the case of Adamson vs. Brockbank (Utah 1948), 
185 P 2d 264. The proper elements of damages were outlined 
as follows: 
"For general damages, the difference in the value 
of the land with and without the ditch . " 
Testimony of Mr. Seo (R. 193, 197, 198): 
Value of farm with gravity ditch ________________ $60,000.00 
Value of farm without gravity ditch ____________ 45,000.00 
Net Loss in Value ________________________________ $15,000.00 
Appellants should feel fortunate that the court restricted 
the measure of damages to a lesser amount which would allow 
for actual pumping expenses incurred and for a substitute 
method of putting water on respondents' lands. 
Quoting further from Adamson I'J. Brockbank: 
" ... For specie~/ damageJ . ... the crops already 
planted or already in (!XiJtena for the year ... , " 
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Appellants complain because the court awarded respond-
ents $2,800.00 for loss of net receipts on a celery crop which 
could not be planted because of lack of water. Let us look at 
the facts: 
( 1) Celery was the main crop of respondents' farm 
(R. 147). 
( 2) The ground had been specially prepared for 
transplanting celery plants from the greenhouse (R. 
171, 428). 
( 3) Respondents maintained their own greenhouse 
on their farm where they had 200,000 celery plants 
growing (R. 426-Exh. 8-P). 
( 4) Respondents had planted their celery plants 
about March 10, 1955, (over 2 months previously) and 
had spent a great deal of time in getting them to a 
stage suitable for transplanting (R. 171). 
( 5) The celery variety was special! y grown and could 
not be replaced-"Utah Improved Jumbo." 
In suggesting that respondents be allowed merely rental 
value for the land involved they overlook the loss of customer 
"goodwill' (R. 180) and the great amount of time and ex-
pense incurred in producing the celery plants, only to have them 
turn yellow and rot before their very eyes because they could 
not be planted. Appellants avoid any alternative suggestion 
that they should reimburse respondents for their loss of the 
greenhouse plants and other expenditures. 
Appellants quote from 108 ALR 1174 as defining the 
rule of damages in the foregoing situation. However, respond-
ents maintain that the quoted statement is the minority rule 
and that the majority rule would allow damages in this 
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situation. At page 1181-2 of the annotation the great majority 
of the cases state--
" . . . if the plaintiff were confined to the actual or 
market value of the growing crop at the date of its 
destruction his damages would fall far short of com-
pensation.'' 
From the annotation at 108 ALR 1181-4 the test of 
whether recovery should be allowed depends on a consideration 
of whether ( 1) the crop was in existence (note similar cases 
in the annotation involving rice crops), ( 2) there was a rea-
sonable certainty that the expected crop would have material-
tzed, ( 3) the crop was an important element of the farm 
program, ( 4) the acts of the defendant were something more 
than simple negligence, and ( 5) the relief afforded is adequate 
to compensate the injured party for his loss. 
It is submitted that the destruction of respondents' celery 
crop and the damages awarded easily meet the foregoing tests. 
Respondents' proof of damages is found in Exhibits 8-P 
11-P and R. 171-192. 
With reference to certain other damage matters mentioned 
by appellants in their brief which should be discussed, the 
following answers are given: 
(1) Must appellants buy tu:o pumps? (Brief 45). 
No. They may take credit for the present pump or they 
may have it. 
(2) 1llr. Seo rradmitted he u·o;dd not sell his tractor 
for" ... $500.00 (Brief 46). 
The evidence established that respondents had to take a 
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W-D Allis-Chalmers tractor originally worth $1,500.00 from 
other farm use and put it to operating the pump. In com-
puting an overall loss of value of $1,000.00 to the tractor, 
Mr. Seo did not state that he wouldn't sell the worn-out 
tractor for $500.00. He said, in explaining their serious lack 
of working capital and financial means (R. 203): 
A. Well, we can't afford to. 
( 3) Ap pel/ants seek to attack the lower court's 
memorandum opinion (Brief 46). 
The court's memorandum is not part of the judgment role 
and is not properly before this court. 
Adamson vs. Brockbank (supra) 
It is not part of the findings and may not be used to 
impeach the findings. 
Fowler vs. Security-First National Bank 
303 P 2d 565 (California) 
v 
THE JUDGMENT SHOULD STAND AGAINST FOUR 
OF THE APPELLANTS. 
As suggested by appellants in their brief, reference will 
be made to the evidence implicating appellants Shaw, Capson, 
Arcon Corporation and Barcon Corporation. 
Both Shaw and Capson undertook to contact respondents, 
and to make promises regarding the ditches and water system, 
long before Arcon Corporation was formed on April 15, 
1955 (R. 168, 170). Lloyd Jackson, the earth-moving con-
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tractor, made direct arrangements with the same two indi-
viduals in February, 1955 (R. 397) for doing much of the 
work in the area. 
Since Arcon Corporation was not in existence, it was only 
logical that Shaw would answer on cross-examination (R. 408): 
A. There was no corporation prior to April 15, 1955. 
Q. So, until that time, you and Mr. Capson would be 
dealing as individuals? 
A. What dealings there were. 
Q. And your activities, prior to that time, would be as 
individuals, would they not? 
A. Yes. 
* * * * 
A. . .. the only purpose of the corporation would be 
to operate and build and develop the area, . . . 
It is admitted that Arcon Corporation may be liable to 
respondents, which is obvious. As to Barcon Corporation, it 
caused the Bowden drain to be installed (R. 362, 411) which, 
according to Engineer John Ward, interfered with the flow of 
water into Spring Runs (R. 303, 328, 330). 
As for appellants Glen L. Peck and Mae L. Bagley, 
respondents notified appellants' attorneys at the conclusion 
of the trial that they would stipulate to a dismissal as to them. 
However, had respondents voluntarily dismissed as to those 
two defendants this portion of this brief would have probably 
been in defense of a charge of releasing joint tort-feasors. The 
inclusion of those two defendants in the Judgment and Decree 
is as much the fault of their counsel, who represented them. 
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The Judgment and Decree can be dismissed as to Peck and 
Bagley insofar as respondents are concerned. 
CONCLUSION 
The writer sincerely believes that the trespass upon 
property rights which has occurred in this action transcends 
any legal or moral excuse which can be advanced in any 
civilized society. If appellants' actions in this case can be 
justified on the facts before the court, then Utah's unique and 
necessary concept of appropriation of water rights will be 
well on its way to destruction. 
The Judgment and Decree should be affirmed in all respects 
as to defendants Arcon Corporation, Barcon Corporation, Shaw 
and Capson. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GLEN E. FULLER 
Attorney for Respondents 
15 East 4th South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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